Energies, Vol. 8, Pages 14197-14218: Designing an Incentive Contract Menu for Sustaining the Electricity Market

This paper designs an incentive contract menu to achieve long-term stability for electricity prices in a day-ahead electricity market. A bi-level Stackelberg game model is proposed to search for the optimal incentive mechanism under a one-leader and multi-followers gaming framework. A multi-agent simulation platform was developed to investigate the effectiveness of the incentive mechanism using an independent system operator (ISO) and multiple power generating companies (GenCos). Further, a Q-learning approach was implemented to analyze and assess the response of GenCos to the incentive menu. Numerical examples are provided to demonstrate the effectiveness of the incentive contract.

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